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NOTES AND COMMENTS
senses.' s In an early Massachusetts decision, the court said that "if
the plaintiff was a person of poor sight, common prudence required of
her greater care in walking upon the streets, and avoiding obstructions,
than is required of persons of good sight."19
The North Carolina court in the principal case, following Foy v.
Winston,20 seemed to agree with this theory. It is clear that the word
"care" as used by the Massachusetts and North Carolina courts refers to
the particular plaintiff's effort or diligence or care and not to the stand-
ard of care. In the Cook case the court avoids any possible confusion by
using the word "effort" as follows: "Plaintiff's evidence compels the
conclusion that he, a blind man, failed to put forth a greater degree
of effort than one not acting under any disabilities to attain due care
for his own safety: that standard of care which the law has established
for everybody. . . . Such a failure to use due care for his own safety
was a proximate contributing cause of his injuries. 12 '
It is submitted that this statement of the North Carolina Supreme
Court leads to a clearer understanding of the standard of care required
of persons under physical disability and, if followed generally, would
remove much of the existing confusion.
DONALD LEON MOORE
Torts-Negligence-Injuries to Elevator Passengers
In a recent case the Supreme Court of North Carolina upheld a
nonsuit on the ground that the plaintiff, an elevator passenger, was
guilty of contributory negligence.' In this case the court, by implica-
tion, followed the rulings of previous North Carolina decisions that
the owner of an elevator owes a passenger riding thereon that degree
of care exercised by the ordinary prudent man under the circum-
stances.? Various jurisdictions have used different approaches in de-
termining the protection to be afforded passengers on elevators in terms
of the duties owed by manufacturers and those under contracts to
mlaintain, as well as owners.
1 "Hill v. City of Glenwood, 14 Iowa 479, 100 N. W. 522 (1904); Winn v.
Lowell, 1 Allen 177 (Mass., 1861); Farm v. North Carolina R. R., 155 N. C.
136, 71 S. E. 81 (1911).
" Winn v. Lowell, 1 Allen 177, 180 (Mass., 1861).
. 126 N. C. 381, 35 S. E. 609 (1900).
" Cook v. Winston-Salem, 241 N. C. 422, 431, 85 S. E. 2d 696, 702 (1954).
1 Waldrup v. Garver, 240 N. C. 649, 83 S. E. 2d 663 (1954). The North
Carolina court held that where the plaintiff's evidence showed that the tenant
of a building failed to use lighting facilities provided by the owner of the build-
ing, opened an elevator, and stepped into an open shaft, a nonsuit was proper
as contributory negligence was shown in the plaintiff's evidence. The court
implied, however, that the defendant building owner owed his tenant the ordinary
degree of care.2 Ramsey v. Nash Furniture Co., 209 N. C. 165, 183 S. E. 536 (1936) ; Hood
v. Mitchell, 206 N. C. 156, 173 S. . 61 (1934); Scott v. Western Union Tele-
graph Co., 198 N. C. 795, 153 S. E. 413 (1930).
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Some courts have ruled with North Carolina in refusing to afford
special protection to elevator passengers with respect to the duty owed
by elevator owners. On the other hand, others have felt that passen-
gers on elevators should be afforded special protection in terms of the
liability of owners and have held owners to the highest degree of care.
4
Those jurisdictions, including North Carolina, which hold the duty
of owners to be that of ordinary care, base their decisions on the propo-
sitions that (1) elevator owners are not servants of the public6 and
(2) they are not under enforceable obligations to receive passengers.0
As practical matters, these reasons are not too cogent, for elevator
owners, especially department stores and hotels, do offer their facili-
3 District of Columbia: Woodward and Lothrop v. Lineberry, 60 App. D. C.
164, 50 Fed. 2d 314 (1913); Iowa: Johnson v. Lincoln Hotel Co., 189 Iowa 29,
177 N. W. 550 (1920) ; Massachusetts: Seaver v. Bradley, 179 Mass. 39, 60 N. E.
795 (1901); Michigan: Burgess v. Stowe, 134 Mich. 204, 96 N. W. 29 (1903);
Missouri: Phegley v. Graham, 358 Mo. 551, 215 S. W. 2d 499 (1948). In this
case the court stated that the defendant building owner owed the ordinary degree
of care, and that he could not delegate this duty. Kennedy v. Phillips, 319 Mo.
573, 5 S. W. 2d 33 (1928); Cox v. Bondurant, 220 Mo. App. 948, 7 S. W. 2d
403 (1925); Montana: Chicas v. Foley Bros. Grocery Co., 73 Mont. 575, 236
Pac. 361 (1925); New Jersey: McCracken v. Myers, 75 N. J. L. 935, 68 At.
805 (1908) ; New York: Cohen v. Sun Ins. Office, 198 N. Y. 177, 91 N. E. 263
(1910). The court in this case stated that a landlord cannot delegate his duty
to use reasonable care in the operation of his elevator so as to relieve himself of
liability. Rhode Island: Edward v. Manufacturer's Building Co., 27 R. I. 428,
61 Atl. 646 (1905); Texas: Martin Inc. Co. v. Trevey, 8 S. W. 2d 527 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1928) ; Washington: Myers v. Little Church by the Side of the Road,
37 Wash. 2d 897, 227 P. 2d 165 (1951). Here the court ruled that a master
owes his servant the duty of supplying a reasonably safe place of work, and
that this duty is non-delegable. West Virginia: Brown v. De Marie, 131 W. Va.
264, 46 S. E. 2d 797 (1948).
"Alabama: Ensley Holding Co. v. Kelly, 229 Ala. 650, 158 So. 896 (1934);
Morgan v. Saks, 43 Ala. 139, 38 So. 848 (1905). In this case the court held
that the defendant was bound to use the highest degree of care while the plain-
tiff was entering the elevator as well as while he was in it. California: Champagne
v. A. Hamburger and Sons, Inc., 169 Cal. 683, 147 Pac. 954 (1915); Treadwell
v. Whitier, 80 Cal. 574, 22 Pac. 266 (1889); Illinois: Carson v. Weston Hotel
Corp., 351 Ill. App. 53, 115 N. E. 2d 800 (1953). Here the court stated the rule
as requiring extraordinary care and diligence on the part of the owner. Hef-
ferman v. Mandel Bros., 297 Ill. App. 272, 17 N. E. 2d 523 (1938); Indiana:
Tippecanoe Loan and Trust Co. v. Jester, 180 Ind. 357, 101 N. E. 915 (1913) ;
Kentucky: Kentucky Hotel Corp. v. Camp, 97 Ky. 424, 30 S. W. 1010 (1895);
Minnesota: Goodsell v. Taylor, 41 Minn. 207, 42 N. W. 873 (1889); Missouri:
Hensler v. Stix, 113 Mo. App. 566, 88 S. W. 108 (1905); Nebraska: Grimmel v.
Boyd, 94 Neb. 240, 142 N. W. 893 (1913); Nevada: Smith v. Odd Fellows Bldg.
Ass'n, 46 Nev. 48, 205 Pac. 796 (1922); Pennsylvania: McKnight v. S. S. Kresge
Co., 285 Pa. 489, 135 Atl. 575 (1926); Fox v. Philadelphia, 208 Pa. 127, 57 Atl.
356 (1904); Virginia: Murphy's Hotel, Inc. v. Cuddy's Adm'r, 124 Va. 207, 97
S. E. 794 (1919); Wisconsin: Dibbert v. Metropolitan Inv. Co., 158 Wis. 69,
147 N. W. 3 (1914). In all of the above cases the owners of elevators were
characterized as common carriers. Oregon: Kelly v. Lewis Inv. Co., 66 Ore 1,
133 Pac. 826 (1913). In this case elevator owners were classified as carriers
for hire rather than common carriers. Texas: O'Connor v. Dallas Cotton Ex-
change, 153 S. W. 2d 266 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941). Here the defendant was held
to the highest degree of care, even though the court refused to hold that he was
a common carrier.
'Edwards v. Manufacturers Bldg. Co., 27 R. I. 248, 61 Atl. 646 (1905).
6 Seaver v. Bradley, 179 Mass. 329, 60 N. E. 795 (1901).
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ties for use by the general public. On the other hand, courts affording
passengers special protection put forward excellent reasons for their
decisions. They point to the fact that an elevator passenger is in a
completely helpless condition-moving either up or down in a machine
over which he has no control, and in which he is unable to protect
himself from serious injury or death.7 Other factors alluded to as good
reasons for affording passengers special protection are the owner's
knowledge that his facilities will be used by the public, and his deriva-
tion of profit from the maintenance of elevators.8
Although North Carolina has refused to grant passengers special
protection in terms of owners' liability, it has afforded them some aid
in suits against one under a contract to maintain the elevators in a
safe condition by labeling elevators "dangerous instrumentalities."
This label enables persons injured in elevator accidents to recover in
actions against persons contracting to maintain elevators, even though
plaintiffs in such actions are not parties to the contracts. Several other
jurisdictions are in accord with North Carolina on this point.10 Still
others have reached the same result without describing elevators as
"dangerous instrumentalities."-" Those courts finding such a duty
point out that where elevators are defective, serious injuries or death
is likely to result, and that such results are traceable to failures on the
part of the contractor to fulfill his contractual obligation to keep in
repair. A few jurisdictions have held that one under a contract to
maintain owes no duty to passengers because they are not parties to the
contract. However, these cases are either old ones,' 2 or ones in which
the defect is chargeable to someone other than the contractor. 13
The Supreme Court of North Carolina has not directly passed upon
the protection to be afforded passengers in terms of the duty owed by
Treadwell v. Whitier, 80 Cal. 574, 22 Pac. 66 (1889).' Champagne v. A. Hamburger and Sons, Inc., 169 Cal. 683, 147 Pac. 954
(1915); Hefferman v. Mandel Bros., 297 Ill. App. 272, 17 N. E. 2d 523 (1938).
In these cases the courts pointed out that elevator owners, especially department
stores and hotels, provide their facilities in order to increase patronage.
'Jones v. Otis Elevator Co., 231 N. C. 285, 56 S. E. 2d 684 (1949). Here
the court was applying Virginia substantive law. Actually the court stated that
an elevator is not an inherently dangerous instrumentality, but that it may become
one by the defendant's work on it.
"0 Dahms v. General Elevator Co., 214 Cal. 733, 7 P. 2d 1013 (1932) ; Berg v.
Otis Elevator Co., 64 Utah 318, 231 Pac. 832 (1924).
" Carson v. Weston Hotel Corp., 342 Ill. App. 602, 97 N. E. 2d 620 (1951);
Dobson v. Otis Elevator Co., 324 Mo. 1147, 26 S. W. 2d 942 (1930). In these
cases the courts held the defendants liable on the ground that one who supplies
a thing for such use by others where it is obvious that any defect will be likely
to result in injury to those so using it, is liable to any person who, using it prop-
erly for the purpose for which it was intended, is injured by its defective condi-
tion.
" Simmons v. Gregory, 27 Ky. L. Rep. 509, 85 S. E. 751 (1905).
"z McDonald v. Haughton Elevator and Machine Co., 60 Ohio App. 185, 20
N. E. 2d 253 (1938).
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elevator manufacturers. In most cases the manufacturers contract
with the owners to maintain the elevator in a safe condition, and suits
are brought against manufacturers for failure to maintain and not on
the grounds of negligent manufacturing. Most jurisdictions that have
determined the duty of manufacturers have preferred to protect the
passenger by finding a duty of ordinary care owed to members of the
public although there is no privity of contract between the defendant
manufacturer and the complaining passenger.14 Only one case has
flatly refused to find such an obligation,' 5 and the court deciding it
failed to give any reasons for so holding.
Regardless of their approach with regard to the duty owed, whether
by manufacturers, contractors to maintain or owners, a number of
the courts have enabled complaining passengers to withstand nonsuits,
even though they fail to prove any specific negligence on the part of
the defendants, by the use of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine.'0 One court
has disagreed with this view for technical reasons, 17 but policy, at least,
seems to be on the side of the courts accepting this view. As a prac-
tical matter, it is almost impossible to prove what specific negligence
was the cause of an elevator accident, even though such accidents are
not likely to occur without negligence on someone's part.
Some courts have further aided injured elevator passengers by
stating that passengers can rely on the safety devices with which ele-
vators are equipped,'18 thus limiting the availability of the defense of
contributory negligence as a bar to their action.
Throughout the cases affording passengers protection runs a cogent
line of reasoning, as follows:
1. Elevator passengers are in a completely helpless position.
" Buteman v. Doughnut Corp., 63 Cal. App. 2d 711, 147 P. 2d 404 (1944). In
this case the court ruled that, as the defendant was the manufacturer of an in-
herently dangerous instrumentality, he owed a duty to the plaintiff even though
there was no privity of contract between the defendant and the plaintiff. Dahms
v. General Elevator Co., 214 Cal. 733, 7 P. 2d 1013 (1932).
" McDonald v. Haughton Elevator and Machine Co., 60 Ohio App. 185, 20
N. E. 2d 253 (1938).
"8Illinois: Carson v. Weston Hotel Corp., 351 Ill. App. 523, 115 N. E. 2d
800 (1953); Hefferman v. Mandel Bros., Inc., 297 Ill. App. 272, 17 N. E. 2d
523 (1938); North Carolina: MdIntyre v. Monarch Elevator and Machine Co.,
230 N. C. 539, 53 S. E. 2d 528 (1949) ; Stewart v. Carpet Co., 138 N. C. 60, 50
S. E. 562 (1905) ; Pennsylvania: McKnight v. S. S. Kresge Co., 285 Pa. 489,
132 Atl. 575 (1926) ; Fox v. Philadelphia, 208 Pa. 127, 57 At. 356 (1904) ; Wis-
consin,: Dibbert v. Metropolitan Inv. Co., 158 Wis. 69, 147 N. W. 3 (1914).
"Feinberg v. Hotel Olmsted Co., 152 Ohio St. 417, 89 N. E. 2d 569 (1949).
The court here refused to apply the res ipsa loquitur doctrine to an elevator
injury where the machine was a self-service elevator on the grounds that it was
not within the exclusive control of the defendant.
" Morgan v. Saks, 43 Ala. 139, 38 So. 848 (1905); Hood v. Mitchell, 206
N. C. 156, 173 S. E. 61 (1934); Garret v. Eugene Medical Center, 190 Ore.
117, 224 P. 2d 563 (1950).
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2. Owners, contractors to maintain, and manufacturers provide their
services for profit.
3. The defects which result in injury are traceable to some derelic-
tion in duty on the part of either the owner, the one under a contract
to maintain or the manufacturer.
4. The specific negligence causing the accident is hard to determine
and prove.
5. Where one of two parties has to suffer, the law will cast liability
on the one who made the injury possible who, in these cases, happens
to be either the owner, the contractor, or the manufacturer.
HENRY L. FOWLER, JR.
Torts-Nuisance-Wild Animals
The North Carolina Supreme Court was recently faced with a most
interesting and unique case arising out of a dispute between adjoining
landowners culminating in an action founded on a theory of nuisance.'
The defendant in this case constructed on his farm in Richmond County
an artificial pond of about three and one half acres at a point within 400
feet of the neighboring plaintiff's farm. During the winter of 1951-52
the defendant placed lame wild geese on his pond and baited the sur-
rounding area of the pond with food, thus attracting large numbers
of migrating geese, southward bound in search of comfortable winter
quarters. Between the months of October 1951 and June 1952 ap-
proximately 200 wild geese nestled by the defendant's pond and from
there foraged on the plaintiff's corn field destroying about one and one
half acres of corn with a market value of $48.00. The next winter the
migrating flock returned, but increased in numbers, and 1200 geese fed
on $105.00 worth of the plaintiff's corn. During the winter of 1953-54
the geese returned for the third time, 3000 strong, and consumed 400
bushels of the plaintiff's wheat ($1,036), seven acres of pasture grass
($100), 140 bushels of barley ($154), and 75 bushels of oats ($52),
causing the plaintiff damages totalling some $1,343.00 for the year.
The defendant, demurring, answered that the complaint failed to
allege any duty owed the plaintiff to protect his property from wild
geese, or that the defendant was negligent in this respect, or in any
respect proximately causing the plaintiff's injury; and that since plain-
tiff failed to allege that the defendant in any way owned, possessed or
controlled the wild geese, he could not be liable for the trespasses of
animals which are ferae naturae.
The supreme court, overruling the trial court, held that the plain-
tiff had stated a good cause of action. The court pointed to the fact
1Andrews v. Andrews, 242 N. C. 382, 88 S. E. 2d 88, (1955).
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